3.136 Fall and Rise of China: Ishiwara Kanji #1: The Man who Began WW2?

Last time we spoke about the reunification of Xinjiang. In Yarkland, chaos erupted as inflation soared, forcing Chinese officials to retreat to fortified New City. As insurgents advanced, Colonel Chin's forces looted and fled, igniting violence against Uyghurs and Hindu moneylenders. By April, rebels captured Kashgar, fracturing Chinese control. Amid shifting alliances, Abdullah revealed a conflict among Muslim troops, leading to a brief Uyghur-Kirghiz unity against the Chinese. After the execution of leader Temur, Abdullah seized Yarkland, while Tawfiq Bay rallied forces, leaving the Tungans besieged amidst chaos. In the tumultuous landscape of 1930s Xinjiang, Ma Chongying's Tungan forces, alongside young Uyghur conscripts, captured Kumul and advanced toward Urumqi. Despite fierce battles, including a significant clash at Kitai, Sheng Shihtsai struggled to maintain control amid shifting loyalties and external pressures. As the TIRET emerged under Khoja Niyas Hajji, internal conflicts and Soviet interventions escalated. Ultimately, Ma Chongying retreated to Russia, leaving Sheng in power, but the region remained fraught with tension and uncertainty.   #136 Ishiwara Kanji Part 1: The Man who Began WW2? Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. “The board is set, the pieces are moving. We come to it at last, the great battle of our time.” Famously said by Gandalf the White. 1931 was the year the Japanese initiated a 15 year long war with China. For those of you who perhaps joined this podcast recently and don’t know, I am Craig and I operate the Pacific War Channel on Youtube. I have been covering the 15 year long China War forever it seems, so when we finally reached this part in our larger story I sat down and thought about how to first tackle this. One thing I really believe needs to be said at the beginning, is a lot of what happened was put into motion by one man, Ishiwara Kanji. For those of you who joined my patreon or later listened to my Ishiwara Kanji series on my channel, this one might be a bit of a refresher. But for those of you who have never heard the name of this man, well let me tell you a story about how a single man caused WW2. Kanji Ishiwara was born on January 18, 1889, in Tsuruoka, located in Yamagata Prefecture, Japan. He was the second son of a policeman who hailed from a lineage of samurai that had historically served the Shonai Domain. This domain had a notable history, particularly during the Boshin War, where Ishiwara's clan supported the Tokugawa Shogunate. Following the defeat of the Shogunate, clans like Ishiwara's found themselves marginalized in the new political landscape of Meiji Era Japan. The power dynamics shifted significantly, with domains such as Choshu and Satsuma gaining the majority of influential governmental positions, while those that had aligned with the Shogunate were largely excluded from power. At the young age of 13, Ishiwara embarked on his military career by enrolling in a military preparatory school in Sendai. He continued his education for two years at the Central Military Preparatory School in Tokyo, where he honed his skills and knowledge in military affairs. In 1907, he entered the Imperial Japanese Military Academy as a member of its 21st class. After two years of rigorous training, he graduated in July 1909, receiving a commission as a Lieutenant and taking on the role of platoon commander in an infantry regiment stationed in the Tohoku region. In 1910, following Japan's annexation of Korea, Ishiwara's regiment was deployed to the Korean Peninsula, where he served in a small garrison in Ch’unch’on. His time there involved two years of occupation duty, during which he gained valuable experience in military operations and leadership. After returning to Tohoku in 1912, Ishiwara pursued further education and successfully passed the examinations required for entry into the Army Staff College in 1915. His dedication and exceptional performance were evident throughout his studies, culminating in his graduation at the top of his class in November 1918. This achievement earned him a prestigious place among the elite ranks of the Gunto Gumi, a distinguished group within the Japanese military, and he was honored with the imperial sword, a symbol of his status and accomplishments. In 1920, Ishiwara found himself facing a challenging assignment within the Department of Military Training. Eager for a change, he applied for service in China and was subsequently assigned to the Central China Garrison in Hankow. Over the course of a year, he traveled extensively through central China, immersing himself in the culture and landscape before returning to Tokyo in 1921. Upon his return, he took on the role of lecturer at the Army Staff College, where he shared his knowledge and experiences with aspiring military leaders. Despite his desire for another assignment in China, Ishiwara's superiors redirected him to Europe, a common practice for promising young officers at the time. He spent three years in Germany, where he dedicated himself to studying languages and military history. By 1925, at the age of 36 and having attained the rank of Major, he received a prestigious assignment to the faculty of the Army Staff College, where he lectured on the history of warfare. From the outset, Ishiwara distinguished himself as an unconventional officer. His eccentricities were well-known; he was often seen as argumentative and struggled with numerous health issues, including recurrent kidney infections, gastrointestinal problems, tympanitis, and other ailments that plagued him throughout his career. Additionally, his ancestry played a significant role in his military life, particularly in the context of the Japanese military's values during the 1930s. Officers from disgraced clans often felt compelled to demonstrate exceptional loyalty to the Emperor, striving to overcome the stigma associated with their lineage, a legacy of distrust that lingered from the early Meiji period. Ishiwara's character was marked by a certain oddity; he was a nonconformist with a fiercely independent spirit. Many biographers note that while he excelled academically, he often disregarded military decorum, particularly in terms of his dress and personal appearance. Early in his career, he voiced his concerns about perceived inequalities within the military, particularly the favoritism shown towards graduates of the staff college. Such outspoken criticism was considered reckless, yet it reflected his deep-seated beliefs. An avid reader, Ishiwara immersed himself in a wide range of subjects, including politics, religion, history, and philosophy, revealing a restless and inquisitive mind. His unconventional behavior and intellectual pursuits garnered attention from his peers, many of whom regarded him as a brilliant thinker. While military personnel are typically required to study military history, few pursue it with the same fervor as Ishiwara. He developed a profound obsession with understanding military history beyond the standard curriculum. His critical examination of the Russo-Japanese War led him to conclude that Japan's victory was largely a matter of luck. He believed that Japan had adopted the von Moltke strategy of annihilation, but the sheer size of Russia made it impossible to defeat them swiftly. Ishiwara posited that had Russia been better prepared, Japan would likely have faced defeat, and it was only through a unique set of circumstances that Japan avoided a protracted conflict. This realization prompted Ishiwara to advocate for a significant shift in Japan's defense planning, emphasizing the need to adapt to the realities of modern warfare. His studies extended to World War I, where he critically analyzed the distinctions between short and prolonged conflicts. He recognized that extended wars often evolved into total wars, where political, economic, and social factors became as crucial as military strategy. This line of thinking led him to categorize wars into two types: “kessenteki senso” (decisive war) and “jizokuteki senso” (continuous war). Ishiwara viewed these categories as part of a cyclical pattern throughout history, with each type influencing the other in a dynamic interplay. During his time in Germany, Ishiwara immersed himself in the study of prominent military theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke, and Hans Delbrück. He found himself particularly captivated by Delbrück's concepts of Niederwerfungstrategie, or "strategy of annihilation," which emphasizes the importance of achieving victory through decisive battles, and Ermattungsstrategie, meaning "strategy of exhaustion," which focuses on wearing down the enemy over time. These theories resonated deeply with Ishiwara, as he recognized parallels between his own ideas and the insights presented in these influential works. This realization prompted him to analyze historical conflicts, viewing the Napoleonic Wars as the quintessential example of annihilation warfare, while interpreting the campaigns of Frederick the Great as emblematic of exhaustion warfare. As Ishiwara advanced in his studies, he became increasingly convinced, much like many of his contemporaries, that Japan and the United States were inevitably on a collision course toward war, driven by conflicting power dynamics and ideological differences. He anticipated that such a conflict would not be swift but rather a drawn-out struggle characterized by a strategy of exhaustion. However, this led him to grapple with a pressing dilemma: how could Japan effectively prepare for a prolonged war when its natural resources were evidently insufficient to sustain such an endeavor? This predicament prompted him to rethink the broader context of Asia. Ishiwara held a strong belief that Asia was a distinct entity, fundamentally different from the West, and he envisioned a future where Asian nations would liberate themselves and unite in solidarity. His enthusiasm was particularly ignited during the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, while he was a young cadet stationed in Korea. The prospect of China revitalizing itself filled him with hope. However, his later experiences in China led to a profound disillusionment. Throughout the 1920s, he encountered rampant banditry, conflicts during the warlord era, and pervasive chaos and disorder. The widespread poverty and instability he witnessed shattered his earlier optimistic vision of China’s potential for progress and reform, leaving him with a more sobering understanding of the challenges facing the region. He wrote this during that time “Looking at the situation in China, I came to harbor grave doubts as to the political capacities of the chinese race and came to feel that, though they were a people of high cultural attainment, it was impossible for them to construct a modern state”. Despite his profound disappointment with the political issues plaguing China, he was equally appalled by the way his Japanese colleagues treated the Chinese people. He vividly recalled feelings of shame when he witnessed fellow colleagues in Hankow disembarking from rickshaws and carelessly tossing coins at the feet of the rickshaw pullers. This behavior struck him as not only disrespectful but also indicative of a broader attitude of racial superiority that he believed needed to be addressed. He frequently expressed in his writings that the Japanese needed to abandon their feelings of racial superiority. Ironically, he often juxtaposed this belief with his conviction that Japan had a duty to guide nations like China toward their rightful destiny. While he advocated for racial equality between Japan and China, he held a markedly different view regarding China’s political landscape. Like many of his contemporaries, he believed that China required significant reform and modernization, which he felt Japan was uniquely positioned to facilitate. To Ishiwara, the pressing issue was that if Japan did not assist China in its development, Western powers would aggressively intervene, further subjugating the nation. He viewed Japan’s role as one of liberation for China, rather than domination. Additionally, Ishiwara connected the impending conflict between Japan and the United States to the broader dynamics of Japan-China relations, suggesting that the outcome of this war would significantly impact the future interactions between the two nations. Ishiwara, like many Japanese military officers of his time, subscribed to the concept of Kokutai, a complex and multifaceted cultural phenomenon that served as a spiritual driving force within the Japanese military. The Kokutai can be understood as the essence of Japan’s national character. Japan operated as a constitutional monarchy, embodying both the Kokutai (the national body or character) and Seitai (the governmental structure). This duality created a unique ideological framework: one aspect emphasized the traditional reverence for the emperor, while the other focused on the official government apparatus.   To simplify this intricate relationship, one might say, “Japan is governed simultaneously by the emperor and the government.” However, this characterization is inherently confusing, as it encapsulates a significant contradiction. Article 4 of the former Japanese constitution stated, “The emperor is the head of the empire, combining in himself the right of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the imperial diet.” This provision suggests the existence of an absolute monarch who is nonetheless expected to heed the advice of democratically elected representatives, creating a paradox that would contribute to the tensions leading to the Pacific War. A critical issue that arose from this constitutional framework was that the military was explicitly stated to be under the control of the emperor, rather than the political diet. Consequently, many military leaders perceived themselves as being beholden to the Kokutai, an ideology that evolved significantly from the Meiji era into the Showa era. For instance, consider a high-ranking military officer who views the political elite as corrupt individuals who have effectively taken the emperor hostage, acting against his will and, by extension, against the will of the Japanese people. Such a perspective could lead to radical actions, including attempts to overthrow the government to restore what they believed to be the rightful authority of the emperor. This ideological conflict presents a fascinating and complex rabbit hole that merits further exploration. Ishiwara had a unique view of the Kokutai. In his early education he wrote this about his doubt on understanding it as a principal. “Even though I, myself, because of my training…had come to have an unshakeable faith in the kokutai I began to lack confidence that I could imparts this belief to others –to the common soldier, to the civilian, to non-Japanese”. Ishiwara grappled with a profound question: how could the concept of Kokutai—the national essence of Japan—be relevant beyond the borders of Japan? He pondered how its significance could extend beyond the specific national interests of Japan. If a Japanese soldier were to lay down his life for the Kokutai, what meaning would that sacrifice hold for individuals of different races and nationalities? Furthermore, he sought to understand how the Kokutai’s universal value could be connected to other ideologies outside Japan. In his quest for answers, Ishiwara turned to Nichiren Buddhism. This spiritual framework allowed him to weave together his thoughts on warfare, historical narratives, and the national purpose of Japan. Interestingly, Ishiwara did not come from a religious background; he had briefly explored Christianity but did not pursue it further. Similarly, Shintoism did not fully resonate with his beliefs. Nichiren Buddhism, however, presented a compelling alternative. It is characterized by a strong sense of patriotism and an apocalyptic vision, positioning itself as a holy mission intended for all of humanity, with Japan at its center. This belief system embodies a quasi-ideology of world regeneration, casting Japan as a moral leader destined to guide others. Given this context, it is easy to see how the Kokutai and Nichiren Buddhism complemented each other seamlessly. By leveraging the principles of Nichiren Buddhism, Ishiwara envisioned a way to elevate the Kokutai from a strictly nationalistic doctrine to a more universal ideology that could resonate globally. His introduction to these ideas came through Tanaka Chigaku, a prominent figure in the Kokuchukai, or "National Pillar Society," which was a nationalist organization rooted in Nichiren Buddhism and based in Tokyo. This connection provided Ishiwara with a framework to articulate a vision of Japan that transcended its geographical boundaries, linking the Kokutai to a broader, more inclusive mission. After attending a public meeting held by Tanaka, he quickly converted to Kokuchukai and he would write down in his journal “I was attracted to the Nichiren faith’s view of the kokutai”. Nichiren buddhism. One element of Kokuchukai’s Nichirenism that strongly attracted Ishiwara was its aggressive passages. He justified much of Japan's military actions on the Asian continent by drawing parallels to Nichiren's concept of wielding the sword to uphold righteousness. He frequently quoted Nichiren's assertion that “the significance of the art of war appears in the wonderful law.” Ishiwara became deeply immersed in Nichiren's teachings and came to believe in its prophecy of a “Zendai mimon no dai toso,” or a titanic world conflict unprecedented in human history, akin to a global Armageddon. Following this conflict, he envisioned a period of universal and eternal peace under the harmony of “the wonderful law.” While in Germany, Ishiwara became convinced that if Japan and the United States were destined for war and the U.S. emerged victorious, the kokutai would be obliterated. He traveled back to Japan via the Trans-Siberian Railway, stopping in Harbin, where he met with Nichiren followers. He shared his thoughts on a “final war,” asserting that it would arise from religious prophecy and his military analysis. He cautioned that Japan must prepare for this impending conflict, declaring that “the final war is fast approaching.” Upon returning to Japan in 1925, he was filled with determination to lecture at the Army Staff College about this final war. His audience consisted of the army's promising young officers, to whom he taught about Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, Moltke, World War I, and, of course, his insights on the looming conflict. The Army Staff College repeatedly requested him to expand his lectures due to their popularity. In 1927, he drafted an essay titled “Genzai oyobi shorai Nihon no kokubo / Japan’s Present and Future National Defense,” in which he discussed the inevitable war between the U.S. and Japan. This essay garnered significant attention from his colleagues. Later, in April 1931, he briefed his fellow Kwantung officers using this essay, advocating for decisive action on the Asian mainland. In 1928, he was scheduled to give another course on European warfare, but he contracted influenza and had to take a leave of absence. As he was recovering, he developed tympanitis in his ear, which required a six-month hospitalization. This was just one of many health issues that would affect him over time. Eventually, he became involved in an elite study group focused on war theories, led by Major Suzuki. This group included young reformist officers who discussed political and military matters. He continued his work on the concept of total war and ultimately wrote “Sensoshi taikan / General Outline of the History of War,” which he presented as a lecture to Kwantung officers in Changch’un, Manchuria, on July 4, 1929. The work underwent revisions in 1931 and 1938 and was published as a book of the same title after 1941. As he began lecturing using Sensoshi taiken he also circulated amongst an inner circle within the Kwantung army “kokuun tenkai no konpon kokusakutaru man-mo mondai kaiketsuan / Plan for the solution of the Manchuria and Mongolia problem as a basic national policy to revolutionize our country’s destiny”, what a title. As you might guess the plan called for occupying Manchuria in preparation for the upcoming war with America. By the way, all of his lectures and works would gain so much fame, he was asked in 1936 to adapt the materials for a text on military history for Emperor Hirohito.  The 1930s were a particularly tense period for Japan. The Japanese leadership perceived Marxism as a pervasive threat, believing it was undermining the nation. Many liberal voices argued that the military budget was excessive and called for cuts. To Ishiwara, this was madness; he questioned how Japan could afford to disarm. While Marxists claimed that communism would rescue Japan, liberals argued that true democracy was the answer. In contrast, Ishiwara and many in the military believed that the Kokutai would be Japan's salvation. Ishiwara advocated his final theories of warfare, asserting that the impending apocalypse would not lead to an American synthesis, but rather a decisive victory for the Japanese Kokutai that would unify the world. “Japan must be victorious not for the sake of her own national interest, but for the salvation of the world. The last war in human history is approaching, Nichiren’s titanic world conflict, unprecedented in human history”. From the outset of his initial theories, Ishiwara was convinced that the final war would be characterized by a strategy of exhaustion. However, World War I and the advancements of the 1920s introduced new technologies like tanks, poison gas, and airplanes. The airplane, in particular, led Ishiwara to believe that the defensive stalemate observed in World War I was nearing its end. He argued that airpower could deliver bomb loads beyond all known defenses, including naval surface units, fortifications, and armies equipped with automatic weapons. Ishiwara predicted that the final war would unleash unimaginable horrors on the world's greatest cities. Cities like London, Shanghai, Paris, and even Tokyo could be devastated within a single day of the outbreak of hostilities. Air bombardment would deliver victory and he would be quite right about that in regards to what would happen to Japan. He believed such a war would be waged only once and “we will enter an age where war will become impossible because of the ultimate development of war technology”. Ishiwara contended that Japan should exert direct or indirect control over Manchuria and, to a lesser extent, certain regions of China. He claimed that Japan had a moral responsibility to the Asian continent and a unique connection to Manchuria and China. He emphasized the need to stabilize China, as its people faced threats from chaos, corruption, and conflict. Ishiwara argued that Japan would ultimately need to take a more proactive role in stabilizing China, especially in Manchuria, for the sake of peace and the well-being of the Chinese population. He wrote in 1930 “To save China, which has known no peace, is the mission of Japan, a mission, which, at the same time, is the only means for the salvation of Japan itself. To accomplish this task it is an urgent matter that the interference of the United States be eliminated”. Ironically, he was advocating that in order to prepare for a conflict with the US, Japan must take a stronger hand in Manchuria and China…which would probably force the United States to confront her. He advocated against the strategy of a decisive battle at sea, instead emphasizing a continental strategy. “If the worst comes about and the war at sea turns against us, if proper measures have been taken, Japanese forces on the Asian mainland can be made self-sufficient and the war continued.” Above all else, Manchuria was the key, alongside parts of Mongolia and China.  In 1931, he started advocating for reforms in China, suggesting that it would be beneficial for the country to accept guidance from Japan. He viewed China as Japan's most important ally in the event of a conflict with the United States. He argued that Japan should make every effort to avoid getting involved in a war with China and should strive to prevent any actions that might provoke such a situation. Yet as he continued his writing he began to see the diplomatic issues play out between China and Japan and came to the conclusion, “every attempt should be made to avoid provoking China, but in the event that it is impossible to bring about China’s understanding, then Nanking should be swiftly attacked and north and central China occupied” way to go 0-60. His attitudes to Britain and Russia were quite similar, every effort should be made to remain friendly, but in the case of war Hong Kong and Malaya should be quickly occupied or in the case of the USSR, predetermined objectives inside Siberia should be seized quickly. Let’s delve into the historical landscape of Manchuria during the late 1920s, a period marked by intense geopolitical maneuvering among Russia, China, and Japan. The region found itself caught in a complex struggle for dominance, exacerbated by the fragmentation of Chinese authority due to rampant warlordism. This instability effectively severed Manchuria’s ties to the rest of China, creating an opportunity for Japan to solidify and expand its influence. The situation in Manchuria, often referred to as the "Manchurian Problem," revolved around a pivotal question for Japanese policymakers: How could Japan consolidate its hold over Manchuria and further its interests in the face of an increasingly assertive China? Japan identified three primary strategies to address this challenge: Control of the South Manchuria Railway: Securing this vital transportation artery would grant Japan significant leverage over southern Manchuria. However, this strategy was fraught with complications, as it necessitated ongoing confrontations with Chinese political forces that opposed Japanese dominance. Utilization of the Kwantung Army: This military force stationed in Manchuria was crucial for projecting Japanese power. Members of the Kwantung Army were particularly concerned about the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek, which threatened the stability of their ally, Zhang Zuolin, known as the "Tiger of Manchuria." While Zhang had been cooperative and acted in Japan's interests, his support could not be guaranteed indefinitely. Japanese Colonization: This approach involved encouraging Japanese settlers to move into Manchuria, thereby establishing a demographic presence that could help legitimize Japan’s claims to the territory. This method, often likened to a “filibuster,” aimed to create a Japanese cultural and economic foothold in the region. Each of these strategies presented distinct pathways forward, each with its own implications for the future of Manchuria and its relationship with China. The Kwantung Army, in particular, was increasingly alarmed by the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment as the Northern Expedition advanced northward. The army viewed Manchuria not only as a territory of strategic interest but also as a crucial buffer against the Soviet Union. The growing instability posed by Chiang Kai-shek's forces and the potential loss of influence over Zhang Zuolin were significant threats that needed to be addressed. Ultimately, many within the Kwantung Army believed that the only viable solution to secure Japan's interests in Manchuria would be to formally detach the region from China, a move that would likely require military intervention. This belief underscored the precarious balance of power in Manchuria during this tumultuous period and foreshadowed the escalating conflicts that would shape the region's future. In June 1927, senior officers of the Kwantung Army were summoned to a crucial meeting convened by Premier Tanaka Giichi. The primary objective of this gathering was to establish Japan's strategic policy regarding China and Manchuria. Within the ranks of the Kwantung Army, a more radical faction led by Colonel Komoto Daisaku was determined to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, who had increasingly become perceived as a significant barrier to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. This faction's resolve culminated in the assassination of Zhang Zuolin in 1928, an event infamously known as the Huanggutun Incident, where a bomb was placed on the train tracks to ensure his demise. However, the outcome of this assassination did not unfold as the Kwantung Army officers had anticipated. Instead of the anticipated rise of their chosen puppet leader, General Yang Yuting, control of Manchuria fell to Zhang Zuolin’s son, Zhang Xueliang. Unsurprisingly, Zhang Xueliang was deeply angered by the murder of his father and was far from compliant with Japanese interests. Consequently, the Kwantung Army found itself in a precarious position, as their aggressive policies in Manchuria backfired, leading to a situation that was even more unfavorable than before. The investigation into the assassination was notably half-hearted, resulting in the dismissal of Colonel Komoto from his position. This political fallout also led to the collapse of Tanaka’s cabinet, leaving the Kwantung Army feeling both embarrassed and enraged over their diminished influence in Manchuria. The Japanese colonists residing in Manchuria, feeling increasingly threatened, began to call upon the Kwantung Army for protection against Chinese nationalists who sought to expel them from the region. In this climate of uncertainty, the Kwantung Army was left scrambling for strategies to detach Manchuria from Chinese control. In 1928, Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara was consulted extensively by Kwantung officers regarding his perspectives on the Manchurian situation. Although he had not yet fully developed his Final War theory at this time, he articulated the fundamental principles behind it, emphasizing the urgent need for decisive action to assert control over Manchuria. Over the following years, Kwantung officers made concerted efforts to shape policy in favor of their interests in Manchuria, with Ishiwara’s ideas gaining traction and stimulating discussions among his high-ranking peers. By October 1928, Ishiwara successfully secured a position on the Kwantung Army staff as an operations officer, with Colonel Komoto Daisaku as his primary supporter. Komoto recognized Ishiwara as the dynamic force needed to advance the aggressive Manchurian policies that the Kwantung Army sought to implement. This collaboration marked a significant turning point in the Kwantung Army's approach to Manchuria, as they aimed to solidify their control and influence in the region amidst growing tensions. When Ishiwara arrived at Port Arthur, he encountered a chaotic and demoralized atmosphere at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. This turmoil was largely a consequence of the disastrous bombing of Zhang Zuolin, which had resulted in significant operational failures. The investigation into this assassination triggered numerous changes within the Kwantung Army's leadership, many of which were quite restrictive and stifling. Despite the catastrophic impact of the Zhang Zuolin incident on Komoto’s career, he continued to advocate for a forceful resolution to the escalating Manchurian crisis. Ishiwara appeared to share this perspective, and during the early months of 1929, he collaborated closely with Komoto to devise military operations aimed at countering Chinese forces in the Mukden region. However, by the spring of 1929, Komoto's position became increasingly precarious, leading to his official dismissal. By May, he had been reassigned to a relatively insignificant divisional post in Japan, and by June, he was completely removed from the army. Nevertheless, this did not signify the end of his influence over Manchurian affairs. His successor was Lieutenant Colonel Itagaki Seishiro, a longtime associate of Ishiwara from their days at the Sendai Military Preparatory School. This connection suggested that while Komoto may have been sidelined, the strategic direction in Manchuria would continue to be shaped by familiar faces and longstanding relationships. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A young, brilliant but perhaps insane man named Ishiwara Kanji began a fruitful military career. After spending considerable time in China, Ishiwara came to a dramatic conclusion, China needed to be saved, and to do so Japan needed to invade Manchuria. He began lecturing like minded youth and built a cult following, directing Japan towards war with China.