Moral Disagreement and Moral Realism | (MoR. 29)

There seems to be widespread moral disagreement across cultures, societies, time periods, and even individuals. Many people think this poses a serious problem for moral realism. In this epic lecture, I evaluate a number of arguments to this effect. Presentation Outline   0 Introduction and Definitions  1 Tolerance  1.1 Conflates theoretical and practical reasons  1.2 Absurd extensions  1.3 It’s not actually intolerant  1.4 Premise (2) 1.5 Self-defeat  2 Self-evidence  2.1 Premise (2)  2.2 Premise (1)  3 Inference to the Best Explanation 3.1 Realist-friendly alternative explanations of moral disagreement  3.2 Fallacy of understated evidence  3.3 Is moral disagreement in need of explanation?  3.4 Does widespread, deep moral disagreement really exist?  3.5 Holistic explanatory assessment  3.6 Self-defeat  3.7 IBE-argument extended 3.8 Summary  4 No Method Argument  4.1 Premise (1)  4.2 Premise (2)  5 Rationally irresolvable disagreement  5.1 What is rational irresolvability?  5.2 Justification vs. dialectical efficacy  5.3 Epistemic peerhood 5.4 Why accept premise (1)?  6 Undermining realist epistemology  6.1 Knowledge doesn’t require knowledge-how  6.2 Proves too much  6.3 Not really an argument from disagreement  7 Self-defeat 8 The extent of moral disagreement  9 Moral Disagreement as evidence for realism? Enoch, David. “How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?”: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aBcq...    Like the show? Help it grow! Consider becoming a patron (thanks!):  https://www.patreon.com/majestyofreason My book: https://www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...   My website: https://majestyofreason.wordpress.com/