How the franchise system is rigged (with Marshall Steinbaum)

In the 20th century, big corporations sold franchising to Americans as a less risky way to buy into business ownership. But in recent years, the franchise industry has tipped hugely in favor of franchisors, extracting wealth from both franchisees and the employees who work for them through complicated contracts that kill competition and rig the system. Economist Marshall Steinbaum returns to the podcast to share the findings from his deep dive into the (intentionally) complex and arcane franchise system, and to explain the latest data from Washington State’s recent enforcement campaign against no-poach clauses in franchising contracts. Marshall Steinbaum is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Utah and a Senior Fellow in Higher Education Finance at Jain Family Institute. Twitter: @Econ_Marshall Vertical Restraints and Labor Markets in Franchised Industries https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4155571  The Effect of Franchise No-poaching Restrictions on Worker Earnings https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4155577  Coercive Rideshare Practices: At the Intersection of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law in the Gig Economy https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4196215  Shared Security, Shared Growth https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/37/shared-security-shared-growth  Website: http://pitchforkeconomics.com Twitter: @PitchforkEcon Instagram: @pitchforkeconomics Nick’s twitter: @NickHanauer